Second Generation Electricity Reforms in Latin America and the California Paradigm by Juan-Pablo Montero & Hugh Rudnick
Documento de Trabajo
ISSN (edición impresa) 0716-7334
ISSN (edición electrónica) 0717-7593
Second Generation Electricity 









SECOND GENERATION ELECTRICITY REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CALIFORNIA PARADIGM 
 
Hugh Rudnick and Juan-Pablo Montero
* 
 
This draft: April 1, 2002 




In this paper we discuss second-generation electricity reforms being formulated in Latin 
America and how they are being reshaped by the California crisis, which had stood as a 
paradigm, at least in theory, for fully competitive markets.  We argue that the main lesson 
policy makers in Latin America should draw from the experience in California and other 
electricity markets around the world is that the liberalization of wholesale markets will 
not result in more competitive outcomes where market concentration is significant, final 
consumers are isolated from actual marginal production costs and capacity is tight. At 
least in the case of Argentina and Chile, the California crisis has had a “positive 
externality” by persuading policy makers, at least momentarily, to postpone liberalization 
reforms and make them realize the complexities in implementing competitive markets. 
 
 
1.  The Latin American electricity supply industry  
 
The electricity supply industry in Latin America has faced a profound transformation in 
the last two decades.
1 Despite challenges are diverse in the region, all countries require 
high investments to respond to a continuous increase in demand. Because electricity 
consumption per capita is relatively small (Figure 1), it is not surprising that while 
industrialized countries have had an average annual growth of electricity consumption 
between 1 to 2%, the Latin American subcontinent has experienced an average growth of 
over 5% during the last decade. 
 
There are other characteristics particular to the Latin American electricity industry. 
Systems are often of a radial nature, with weakly meshed networks and only few 
incipient international interconnections. Hydro generation is the dominant supply source 
in the region with a share of 71,8% of the total installed capacity (1997 figures) and often 
with plants within complex series hydrological schemes. Out of the 190,000 MW 
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installed in the region in 1997, Brazil dominates with 31%, followed by Mexico with 
20%, Argentina and Venezuela, each with 11%. 
 
The electricity sector was developed initially, at the end of the 19th century, by private 
investors, often mining and industrial entrepreneurs bringing the technology to the 
region.  However, while electric energy became a basic tool for development, the 
economic crisis of the 1930’s brought private investment to a halt.  Governments started 
to take action and state-owned national electricity companies developed, examples being 
Eletrobras, Edelca, Endesa Chile, Electroperú, ISA, and Comisión Federal de 
Electricidad, among others. These state companies integrated vertically, performing all 
activities in the sector, and centrally planning operation and expansions.   Often, these 
companies grew like states within a state, regulating themselves as state monopolies. 
 
However, these state monopolies often had intrinsic conflicts, where efficient social 
supply objectives were confused with political intervention, where tariff subsidies and 
unemployment control coupled with inefficient management. High losses and economic 
and financial crises of those companies resulted many times in problems with quality and 
security of supply. Furthermore, companies were not able to raise and support the needed 
financial credit to maintain high investment to provide for high demand growth. As a 
consequence, states had to intervene quite often. 
 
Within that framework, reasons for deregulation, and privatization, differ from those of 
similar processes elsewhere.  The driver has been the need to establish conditions for 
economic efficiency and private investment.  States withdrew from the electricity sector 
and took a subsidiary roll, with the possibility to intervene only when private sector fails 
to do so, but mainly concentrating in regulation and control. With those objectives in 
mind, the centralized planning and operation was replaced with more decentralized 
approaches, in a process of de-verticalization, de (re)-regulation and privatization. 
 
Reform schemes have very much been conditioned by the hydroelectric characteristic of 
the systems. All country deregulation models have constituted centralized generation 
pools, i.e., poolcos (Rudnick, Varela and Hogan, 1997), based on a monopolistic co-
ordination of generator operation and marginal cost based dispatch seeking to emulate 
perfect competition conditions. Competition is stimulated at the generation level, with 
prices unregulated for large consumers, with a pass through scheme defined for small 
consumers. Table 1 summarizes the design of the poolcos in countries that have led 
reform. Most countries introduced a two-part price scheme, where short-term marginal 
energy costs couple with capacity pricing, an additional economic element formulated as 
an adequacy signal to stimulate new investment and expansion. Marginal costs also 
incorporated nodal differences to reflect generation-transmission interaction. 
 
With the exception of Colombia, the “wholesale markets” organized around these power 
pools are not really markets like the ones observed in the pools of England and Wales and 
Australia where generators face virtually no restriction on their bids. As explained in 
Table 1, generators in Chile and Brazil are dispatched based on (audited) estimates of 
their marginal production costs while in Argentina thermal generators are dispatched  3
based on bids that can only be changed every six months. The Colombian Pool, on the 
other hand, is quite similar to the England and Wales Pool in the sense that all energy is 
centrally dispatched by the system operator (SO) based on day-ahead bids made by 
generators. Each generator submits a daily bid schedule consisting of a bid price and an 
available capacity for each hour of the following day. Every hour the SO dispatches the 
generators up to their available capacity to satisfy demand and the clearing price for that 
hour is equal to the bid of last generator being dispatched (it is a first-price multiunit 
auction). 
 
The rest of the market is segmented, with central regulation for transmission and 
distribution. Transmission open access regulation is used, with global allocation of 
network costs in a use-of-system approach. Incentive-based regulation is used in 
distribution. Segmentation varied from country to country, with remains of vertical and 
horizontal integration.  
 
2.  Successes, failures and need for further reform 
 
Electricity prices have declined significantly in most Latin American countries in the last 
decade, reflecting decreasing marginal costs due to the arrival of combined cycle gas 
turbine technologies and important amounts of private investments have flowed to the 
region. Security and quality of supply has increased, a striking example being Argentina 
with a drastic reduction of non-served energy from high rates of 16% a month (25% a 
day) in the late 80s to virtually zero today. 
 
Those successes in Latin America have coupled with market design problems, with 
struggles in the governing of the independent operator, conflicts on wholesale market 
energy prices and capacity prices, difficulties in transmission open access and in 
distribution pricing. Most recently, concern has grown on signals of a decreased interest 
by the private sector in continuing the high rate of investment both in generation and 
transmission. This has been worsened in recent years with supply deficits in Chile and 
Brazil, affected by severe droughts, which have tested market designs to the limit.   
 
The Chilean 1998-1999 supply crisis is a learning example. A severe supply disruption 
took place with rolling blackouts, conflicts among electricity companies and with the 
regulator, and a significant social and economic impact on society, which led the country 
to hurried emergency changes to the electricity law.  Although the origin of the crisis was 
essentially conditioned by exogenous factors (a centennial drought), the elements that 
prompted the crisis were very similar to those that later influenced the California crisis. 
While short-term marginal costs increased up to the cost on non-served energy, regulated 
consumers—which account for more than 60% of electricity consumption—were making 
consumption decisions based on a long-term marginal cost of production completely 
isolated from the true marginal production cost at the moment. This uncoupling between 
supply shortage and forced demand inelasticity in practice meant a failure of the price 
system. Although generating companies had potential alternatives to cope with the crisis 
if the right prices had been in place (Diaz et al., 2000), the lack of such correct price  4
signals slowed action, worsening impact on the companies themselves and the country as 
a whole. 
 
The crisis also demonstrated, dramatically, the difficulties of the political class to face 
emergency conditions in energy supply. Although the regulator had legal tools to manage 
the crisis by bringing spot prices closer to marginal costs, ill thought solutions were taken 
to ensure supply and protect quality and security.  In practice these hasty solutions 
created new problems that later weakened the contract system, leaving distributing 
companies with no support to ensure future electricity provision. 
 
A similar questioning has arisen in Argentina, criticizing the pass through price scheme, 
even in normal non-emergency conditions. The centralized dispatch and the regulated 
prices to final consumers are under attack. Resultant prices are questioned as not 
reflecting real market conditions, thus slowing new investments, weakening adequacy of 
supply and limiting the entry of new competitors. 
 
Consequently, the need to reform the market regulations and increase competitive 
conditions has been seen as a necessity. Argentina, Chile and Brazil, among others, have 
been searching for alternatives. While the UK Pool has served as the model for 
Colombia, the California line of thinking arose as a new paradigm that was studied with 
interest by the rest of the region.
2 Criticism had arisen on the centralized poolcos, 
formulating the need for a second stage of reform, establishing highly flexible 
mechanisms of decentralized exchanges, and achieving real market mechanisms, with 
wholesale and retail competition. 
 
While the second-generation concepts are not unique to California, as countries such as 
Norway, the UK (with its recent NETA scheme) and Spain have made similar reforms, 
the California model arose as the paradigm in the region. Given the vast experience with 
the operation of centralized pools, it is surprising that the alternative restructuring option 
along the lines of the pools in the UK and Australia was not seriously considered at the 
time. 
 
The defined objective was, within the California paradigm, to replace the centralized 
pools and to force “perfect” competition with the laissez faire model of the Power 
Exchange (PX), coupled to an Independent System Operator (ISO) that dispatches 
essentially based on long-term physical bilateral contracts plus short term unrestricted 
bids. Critics of the Latin American schemes argued that commercial agreements should 
determine the dispatch through successive markets, with supply and demand 
independently considering all relevant variables in their decisions, including business 
uncertainties. They argued that this would also allow development of markets for all 
types of transactions of the electrical product (ancillary services, reserves, load shedding, 
etc.), including financial derivatives (futures and options markets). Within the new line of 
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thinking, nodal price schemes were discarded and explicit capacity payments were either 
not considered or substantially modified.
3 
 
Retail competition was also seen as a necessity, with transparent distribution and 
transmission regulated pricing that would bring competition to all consumers. Large 
consumers could then directly negotiate for their power supplies with generators or buy 
directly in the spot market while smaller consumers (mostly residential) could have the 
option to buy power from different retailers including the actual distribution company. 
The concept of regulated consumer would be gradually phased out, with demand driving 
prices and quality of supply.  This meant further segmenting the industry at the 
distribution level, separating the operation and maintenance of the distribution network 
from power retailing. 
 
3.  Lessons from California 
 
With the California crisis developing and its power exchange being closed, the concern 
arose in Latin-American countries about the validity of this new paradigm for second 
stage reforms. The California crisis froze the changes and questioned the new reform 
proposals. Countries questioned themselves if they were seeking a remedy worse than the 
disease, assuming that unregulated bid based spot exchange markets that also drive 
system operation were simpler than their counterpart. They also wondered about the 
dominant positions that may develop in highly horizontal and vertically integrated 
conditions. 
 
Chile provides good evidence on this change of perspective regarding the potential 
benefits of market liberalization. The reform program designed by the Executive (CNE, 
2000) was originally scheduled to go through congressional review and approval by the 
beginning of 2001. For several reasons, including the events in California, the Executive 
decided to postpone congressional review until further studies and analysis about the 
most appropriate reform program were conducted. A new draft of legislation is being 
crafted with dramatic differences from the original design. Apparently, the Californian 
decentralized approach is being replaced with an approach following the UK Pool model. 
The current centrally dispatched system based on audited marginal costs would then be 
replaced with a dispatched system based on firms’ actual bids. Bidding rules, however, 
would give firms much less freedom than in the UK Pool. As an effort to prevent market 
power problems, bids could be changed on less frequent basis, perhaps, monthly or even 
every six or twelve months. 
 
California provided important lessons for Latin America, on issues such as market design 
(centralized bid-based pools vs. decentralized systems), decoupling of the different stages 
of market operation and physical operation, market governing, environmental restrictions, 
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market power and gaming, capacity payments, contracts and demand price elasticity. It 
showed how partial deregulation could make matters worse than otherwise and how 
lengthy and uncertain legislative processes can have detrimental effects on investments. 
California also showed that electricity deregulation must be understood as a dynamic 
regulatory process where institutions must be flexible enough to introduce changes as 
circumstances require. In what follows we organize the discussion on the lessons from 
the California crisis around five topics:  market power, hydro predominance, system 
governance, demand-side response and capacity payments. 
 
3.1 Market  power  
 
A factor that is being thoroughly assessed in California is that of market power exercise 
and its impact on PX prices. Although there is no coincidence by analysts of the real level 
of power exercised, a global concern has grown on the matter. Latin America has 
conditions that may worsen what took place in California. In fact, the experience in the 
Colombian pool has not been very different from the experience in California in terms of 
market power problems. Particularly during periods of scant rainfall the exercise of 
market power has become a serious problem. The exercise of market power has been 
facilitated by relatively high concentration levels (3 largest companies own about 55% of 
installed capacity) and a provision that prevents water levels in the different reservoirs 
from falling below a minimum level. 
 
With the exception of Argentina, concentration of ownership is relatively high in most 
countries in the region. It seems that the long-term trend is for just a few operators to 
manage the region, both at the generation level and the distribution level. In such 
conditions it may be more difficult to develop mechanisms to assure free entry to the 
market for generation and preventing the exercise of market power. Further, because 
antitrust legislation is generally weak or non-existent in Latin-American countries, it 
seems that the design of any deregulatory effort must be comprehensive enough to 
incorporate means to diagnose and mitigate market power problems in case they appear. 
 
Unfortunately, the California policy design does not provide many insights on how to 
prevent the exercise of market power.
4 We believe that one of the main policy mistakes 
was to require the three large investor-owned-utilities to work exclusively with the PX 
day-ahead market without letting them sign long-term contracts. Although utilities were 
free to hedge in the PX forward market, for some reason this market never really 




In any case, the use of bilateral contracts, whether is voluntary or mandatory, can be an 
important instrument to reduce market power (Green, 1999, Villar and Rudnick, 2002). 
As more generation is contracted in advance, generators find less profitable to withhold 
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capacity or raises prices in the spot market simply because part of their output has been 
already contracted at a price different than the spot price. In anticipation of more 
competition (i.e., lower prices) in the spot market, firms are also likely to sign more 
competitive contracts. 
 
Many countries in the region do not seem to provide the basic conditions for the 
development of competitive wholesale markets. Either significant divestiture or market 
expansion through interconnection with other markets would be required before market 
liberalization. In the case of Chile, it seems obvious from the international experience 
that a market where three generating companies own 94% of the installed capacity is very 
unlikely to yield competitive outcomes. Before liberalization of the wholesale market the 
government of Chile should not only consider divestiture and mandatory contracting 
measures but also building transmission connections between the central and northern 
interconnected systems and, perhaps, between Chile and Argentina (Montero and 
Sanchez, 2001). This would considerably increase competition among generators and 
would reduce the proportion of hydropower generation that is also a concern for the well 
functioning of these markets. 
 
3.2 Hydro  predominance 
 
Another condition that has not a parallel in California is the predominance of 
hydroelectricity in Latin America. There is little knowledge world wide on the exercise of 
market power in predominantly hydroelectric systems, nor on its impact on an adequate 
reservoir usage and on price volatility. Because a system with a large fraction of 
hydropower is subject to constant changes in supply and costs and to periods of very tight 
capacity (i.e. during droughts), the deregulatory design needs to deal explicitly with this 
issue. California showed that market power problems are particularly serious during 
periods of tight supply. 
 
Brazil, with its dominantly hydro-based power system, faces an electricity crisis resulting 
from a severe drought. Rather than questioning the effect of dispatch rules and poor 
investment on the crisis, the Brazilian case seems to suggest that predominately hydro-
based systems provide the least favorable conditions for the development of competitive, 
privately owned generation markets, or for that matter, that these are the most difficult to 
design. Hydro power plants involve high fixed costs and negligible variable costs. There 
is a risk that prices can be held down by the regulator during periods of tight capacity (i.e. 
drought) and can fall close to zero during periods of excess rainfall in a competitive 
market. 
 
Research is being performed in the region to identify the possibility of liberalization of 
the market through bid-based schemes and the presence or absence of market power, 
particularly in predominantly hydro markets (Watts and Rudnick, 1998).  Kelman, 
Barroso and Pereira (2001) demonstrated that in a highly hydro system like the Brazilian 
one, long-term system dispatch could be significantly affected, particularly through 
strategic manipulation by the large reservoirs. They found that hydro plants increased 
spot prices by decreasing the water transfers from wet to dry seasons.  8
 
In a short-term simulation exercise for the main Chilean system, Villar and Rudnick 
(2002) also found significant problems of market power. They assume a linear demand 
with elasticities varying from –0.04 to –0.4 (depending of the level of consumption), that 
all energy is sold in the spot market and that firms bid for quantities and prices for each 
hour during a particular day. They compare three market structures: the competitive 
market (competitive), the current market of three companies in which one is a 
predominantly hydro-based (game by firms) and a hypothetical market in which each 
power unit represents an independent company (game by units). Hydro generation and 
price levels for each market structure are presented in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. When 
the market is not competitive there is a substantial shift of water resources from periods 
of high demand (11-13 and 17-21) to periods of low demand resulting in tremendous 
price increases. As indicated by the units game, divestiture has an important effect but is 
of limited scope because hydro units are relatively large. 
 
Colombia provides some interesting evidence of the complexities in dealing with 
problems of market power in systems with a large fraction of hydropower plants. To 
avoid tight supply conditions, the Colombian pool puts restrictions on hydro units’ bids 
when water levels are below some predefined levels. Stacchetti (1999) claims that such 
an approach has helped some firms to effectively exercise more market power than 
otherwise. Much more theoretical and empirical research is needed to understand 
problems of market power in hydro systems and means to mitigate it. 
 
Bilateral contracts, whether financial or physical, can have an important effect in 
diminishing market power in a mainly hydro system (and it is demonstrated in 
simulations by Villar and Rudnick, 2002). In hydro based systems contracts would be of 
interest, given the high price volatility. A particular aspect of those systems is the 
variability of the income of the agents in the market. In the short term the volatility of the 
income is small, since water can be stored transferring energy from off peak hours to 
peak hours. However, in the mid-term the income can register important fluctuations. 
Predominantly hydroelectric systems are designed to assure supply under adverse 
hydrology conditions, however this situation rarely occurs. As consequence of this, most 
of the time the spot market is low, due to overcapacity. On the other hand, if dry 
conditions arise, the spot price can dramatically increase. Thus, contracts become a 
valuable tool to stabilize revenues. The more capacity contracted the less the impact of 
spot prices on generator revenues. As more capacity is engaged, opportunities for the 
exercise of market power are reduced and more generators may be available to bid 
residual energy required in the market. 
 
3.3 System  governance 
 
A market design with an ISO and a PX is more a complex structure than a centralized 
poolco type scheme. Very central to the success of this market model is the governance 
design of those entities, avoiding what happened in California. The participation of 
agents of the market (for example, generators) that may benefit from decisions may 
introduce bias to the decision process and cloud its needed transparency. This has been  9
recognized by FERC, which ordered changes in that regard. Proposals in Latin America 
to separate the operator and the exchange, as private audited companies in which market 
agents do not participate, except the transmitter in the operator, seem better solutions. 
 
Even though the requirement that the three California IOUs centered their exchanges in 
the PX, restricting the establishment of bilateral contracts, was of a transient character, 
we believe that this restriction played a crucial role in the development of the crisis. It is 
important that the PX constitutes only a voluntary market and only for complementary 
adjustments to the contracts market, and so are the concepts being considered in 
Argentina and Chile. 
 
3.4 Demand  elasticity 
 
Another important factor that contributed to the California crisis was the “elimination” of 
any possible demand-side response by the use of price caps to final consumers. Similar 
conditions could arise in the regulation of pass through prices in Latin American 
countries. A wrong forecast by the regulator of the resulting evolution of prices could 
result in lower or greater values, as compared to real market prices. This wrong forecast 
produced disastrous results in California, upon freezing prices to final consumers, while 
IOUs, without long-term contracts, were buying at higher values in the PX. Fixing prices 
may discourage new investments deterring the necessary expansion in generation. 
 
Latin American proposed reforms have also exclusively focused on the supply side of the 
market neglecting the central role that demand-side response can play in the development 
of the competitive markets. As discussed by Montero and Rudnick (2001) for the case of 
Chile, the development of mechanisms that permit final consumers to react to price 
changes in the wholesale market has not only lead to allocative efficiency in the short-run 
but also to substantial savings in capacity investments. 
 
In addition, through effective retail competition demand can respond to price fluctuations 
and help alleviate market power. Transactions among generators, end users and a number 
of intermediaries, including retailers, brokers and the existing distribution company 
would take place freely. End users would be free to choose their supplier and to negotiate 
their contracts. Introducing consumer choice and demand responsiveness can have some 
limits, however. The cost of metering for small consumers may be higher than the 
savings from lower electricity bills.
6    
 
3.5 Capacity  payments 
 
One aspect that has not been sufficiently studied in California relates to economic signals 
for new installed capacity, fundamental in markets with significant growth and highly 
subject to supply shocks (e.g. droughts). While in theory spot prices provide the right 
incentives for new investments even in capital incentive industries (unless demand is 
totally inelastic), several market analysts argue that in electricity markets such price 
signals are insufficient and can lead to underinvestment. In that regard, most of the actual 
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Latin American regulations contain a provision to prevent that from happening; the so-
called capacity payments (see Table 1). It often remunerates investment in generation by 
its contribution to peak capacity, independent of its energy contribution. 
 
The elimination of this capacity payment in the second-generation reforms under 
consideration, particularly in Chile, is a matter that deserves a greater analysis.
7 While 
traditional capacity payment schemes (like those in Colombia, Argentina and Spain) may 
not necessarily provide appropriate incentives for new investments, there are alternative 
market-based mechanisms that could be considered such as the creation of some form of 
capacity markets (as in PJM) or having the regulator buying call options from power 
generator at some strike price (Vázquez et al., 2001).   
 
4. Concluding  remarks 
 
There is no doubt that the California crisis has reshaped reform programs across Latin 
American countries. In the case of Argentina and Chile, the authority has been persuaded, 
at least temporarily, to postpone liberalization reform and apparently has desisted from 
using a decentralized approach like the one in California and in Chile begun considering 
a centralized bid-based system like the pools in UK (before NETA) and Australia. 
Whether a centralized approach like the one in the UK pool can be more or less effective 
in preventing the exercise of market power than a decentralized approach is an open 
question. A centralized bid-based system, however, does allow the regulator to move 
gradually from an audited cost dispatch system to fully liberalized market. For instance, it 
is possible at the beginning to restrict firms’ bids to be changed on less frequent basis 
than on a daily basis. 
 
We believe the main lesson policy makers in Latin America should draw from the 
experience in California and other electricity markets around the world is that the 
liberalization of wholesale markets requires a comprehensive approach that take into 
account simultaneously both the supply and demand side of the market. It has become 
evident that liberalization will not result in more competitive outcomes unless potential 
market power problems are explicitly addressed. Policy makers must study different 
mitigation options such as divestiture (e.g., Argentina), minimum amount of contracting 
and possibly price caps. 
 
In addition if energy prices are thought to be insufficient to secure the proper amount of 
installed capacity, we think that market-based mechanisms should be the preferred policy 
option instead of the traditional capacity payments actually in place in most countries of 
the region. A sound market design must also assure that final consumers (with the 
exception of small residential consumers) are not isolated from wholesale market prices. 
Moreover, demand liberalization does not need to wait for supply liberalization. Real-
time pricing can be gradually introduced while the (audited) marginal costs that clear the 
pool dispatch can serve as a proxy for the wholesale market price. 
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Although at a lower pace, energy regulatory reform in the region will continue and 
significant regulatory changes will eventually develop. Fortunately, these changes are or 
will be implemented in a region where the different agents and the regulators have 
already walked a path of reform, and are learning from their own success and failures as 
well as those of others. The path is still being defined, but clearly the naive approach to 
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Table 1. Power pools designs 
Country Hydro 
capacity 
Dispatch   Capacity payment 
Argentina  43 %   CAMMESA (Compañía Administradora del Mercado 
Eléctrico Mayorista) 
Economic dispatch defines hourly marginal cost 
Hydro and thermal gens declare their prices on a 
weekly basis every six months. There are price caps 
defined by regulator for thermal gens and defined 
procedures for estimating the value of stored water. 
Nodal pricing. 
Payment to gens contributing 
with energy in the 90 hours of the 
weekly peak demand period. 
Depends on dispatch. It is fixed at 
10 US$/MWh. 
Brazil  90 %  ONS (Operador Nacional del Sistema)  
Economic dispatch defines monthly marginal cost 
Thermal gens variable cost are audited. Hydro gens 
dispatched according to cost of water calculated by 
ONS. 
Payment being considered. 
Chile  61 %   CDEC (Centro de Despacho Económico de Carga) 
Economic dispatch defines hourly marginal cost 
Thermal gens variable cost are audited. Hydro gens 
dispatched according to cost of water calculated by 
CDEC. 
Nodal pricing. 
Payment to gens contributing 
with capacity in the yearly peak 
demand period (may-sep). 
Depends on availability, time to 
start and time to full load. 
Independent of dispatch. 
Capacity price defined by 
regulator every six months, fixed 
cost of gas turbine. 
It is fixed at 5.25 US$/kW/month 
Colombia  66 %  CND (Centro Nacional de Despacho)  
Economic dispatch defines operation 
Energy Power Exchange receives daily bids from 
gens (prices and energy), hourly price determined 
without considering network restrictions.  
Payment to gens contributing 
with energy in dry season (dec-
apr) in an extra-dry season. It is 
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Figure 1. Per capita electricity consumption and PGB (1997) 
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Figure 3: Clearing prices 
 
 
 
 
 